What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason
When it was first published in 1972, Hubert Dreyfus’s manifesto on the inherent inability of disembodied machines to mimic higher mental functions caused an uproar in the artificial intelligence community. The world has changed since then. Today it is clear that “good old-fashioned AI,” based on the idea of using symbolic representations to produce general intelligence, is in decline (although several believers still pursue its pot of gold), and the focus of the Al community has shifted to more complex models of the mind. It has also become more common for AI researchers to seek out and study philosophy. For this edition of his now classic book, Dreyfus has added a lengthy new introduction outlining these chang… More >>
$19.99
4.0
What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason

November 25th, 2009 at 2:21 pm
Creation science is to evolution what this book is to artificial intelligence.
Creation “scientists” often have no credentials in the field they attack; similarly, Dreyfus is a philosopher, not a computer scientist.
Creation “scientists” often use inflated rhetoric and impute dishonesty to their opponents; similarly, Dreyfus has likened AI to alchemy and made scandalous allegations against AI researchers such as Simon.
Creation “scientists” only attack evolution; they do not provide any scientific alternative; similarly, Dreyfus only attacks strong AI and does not offer any alternative line of research.
The criticisms of creation “scientists” are based on religion; Dreyfus bases his critique on philosophy. Neither critique has any scientific foundation.
Creation “scientists” continue to advance objections that have been decisively refuted, such as arguments based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics or the bogus Paluxy River tracks. Bogus claims are rarely retracted. Similarly, Dreyfus has rarely acknowledged that many of his previous claims have been refuted.
Finally, creation “scientists” have had essentially no impact on evolutionary biology, but great impact among the lay public. Similarly, Dreyfus’ book is popular among non-scientists, but has had very little impact among people who actually do AI.
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Rating: 2 / 5
November 25th, 2009 at 2:41 pm
Scientists have formulated at least 100 definitions of what intelligence is. (for a partial listing see http://www.vetta.org/definitions-of-intelligence/)
Several computer programs exist which qualify as intelligent according to at least the vast majority of these definitions. (for instance my Asa, Trans. of the Kansas Acad. of Sci., vol. 109, # 3/4, pg 159, 2006,
http://www.bioone.org/archive/0022-8443/109/3/pdf/i0022-8443-109-3-159.pdf) Not all creatures are equally intelligent so there is no need for an AI to be as intelligent as the average human. In point of fact, however, AIs exist which outperform humans at a number of important tasks.
Rating: 2 / 5
November 25th, 2009 at 5:07 pm
Mr. Shallit, in a previous review, sounds exactly like a throwback to the previous era when glorified computer technicians started to take themselves seriously and bestowed upon themselves the bogus title of “computer scientists”. When Dreyfus critique of strong AI came out they were enraged that someone was trying to punch the air (and as it turned out it was full of hot air) out of their over inflated clown balloon. After decades of sheer nonsense, and of confusing metaphor with the real thing (their preposterous proposition of the “complexity critical mass” for intelligence is akin to thinking that a sufficiently complex computer simulation of an atomic explosion will actually explode: I guess we should all be really worried…) strong AI proponents just gave up. Now they are much quiet and many have given Dreyfus some concessions after being proven completely wrong (old habits die slowly). No serious GCT (Glorified Computer Technician) of today would profess faith in strong AI.
Rating: 5 / 5
November 25th, 2009 at 5:18 pm
Berkeley Professor Hubert Dreyfus assesses the predictions and subsequent failures of artificial intelligence from its inception in the 1960’s with innovators like Turing to the present day with a detailed and honest account of why higher level AI is impossible. After evaluating the history of AI’s minuscule progress, Dreyfus provides a compelling analysis of human intelligence, drawing on the philosophies of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Merleau-Ponty in order to demonstrate that higher level cognitive faculties are not reducible to computational representations. This book is an important reversal of commonly accepted assumptions within the cognitive sciences, from linguistics to psychology. It is also an important example of why the cognitive sciences would benefit from paying greater attention to the achievements of contemporary European philosophy.
Rating: 4 / 5
November 25th, 2009 at 7:07 pm
I would love to see a working “HAL”, and still hope we progress in the development in AI. However, the discovery of a General Problem Solver has always been elusive, and never matched the corresponding development for the raw physical abilities our computers now have. Why is that? And why is this still true?
Mr. Dreyfuss attempts to answer this with a refreshing accountability of the scientific method. He compares the historical development of AI to the theoretical expectations, and apparently not without resistance. He manages to challenge the “salesmanship” of following trends, and thus avoiding assumed results.
The book provides many examples of its logic, and carefully draws the conclusions. When I first read it I was tremendously impressed with its (if I may) “insights”. I feel it is a must read; not just for those in the AI world, but for those interested in the scientific method as well.
Rating: 5 / 5